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ABSTRACT
The effects of taxes on direct investment capital outflows are
investigated using a theoretical model which integrates the investment and
financial decisions of the parent and subsidiary. The resulting marginal qs
and costs of capital show that intrsfirm investment allocation and tax
neutrality results critically hinge on the marginal financing regime. By
identifying a channel(s) through which a specific tax policy affects firm
decisions, the model evaluates the combined effects of the home country tax
system on direct investment. Out analysis suggests that while the 1986 U.S.
Tax Reform Act may have an ambiguous effect on the overall level of capital





New Haven, CT 065201. Introduction
International direct investment, which implies a controlling interest by an investor in
one country in a business enterprise or property in another country, has become an important
economic phenomenon and a concern of tax policy. If long-term capital is highly mobile
across national boundaries, it will no longer be rational to design tax systems without taking
such capital flows into account. For example, a country with relatively high tax rates will
drive domestic businesses abroad while a country with generous investment allowances will
attract more investments from foreigners. The tax treatment of foreign source income is also
a major factor in the foreign investment decision.
This paper investigates three major channels through which domestic tax policy affects
direct investment capital outflows. First, tax policy can influence the way in which foreign
source income is shared among the firm, the home country government and the host country
government. In addition, it can affect the relative net profitability of investments in
different countries. Lastly, tax policy can affect the relative net cost of raising external
funds in different Countries.
The first channel, tax policy toward foreign source income, has long been a subject of
policy debate and political controversy. Most of the existing literature is also concerned
with this aspect of the tax effects on international capital movements. One major concern
regarding international investment is the possibility for foreign source income to be taxed
twice, once by the host country government and again by the home country government. In
general, the home country can adopt one of two approaches to prevent the double taxation of
foreign source income. Under the territorial' approach, the home country does not tax
foreign source income at all. Under the more common residence approach, foreign source
income is subject to home country taxation, but a credit or deduction is allowed for taxespaid to the host country government. Furthermore, the home country tax can be deferred
untit the foreign source income is repatriated to the domestic parent. These tax deferrats,
combined with the foreign tax credit, can hold important implications for an international
firms in'estment and financial decisions. This paper is primarily concerned with the
residence approach, a system which prevails in many industrial countries including the U.S.
The second major channel through which taxation influences direct investment is the
home countrys tax policy towards domestic investment. The direct investment decision of
international firms is affected by a variety of factors. These firms establish branches and
subsidiaries abroad to secure local markets, to have easy access to raw materials, and to take
advantage of lower labor costs, for example. All these factors can be summarized as
representing the expectation of higher profitability from venturing abroad. Tax policy can
influence the decision of investment location by affecting the relative net profitability
between different places.
The third channel is related to the way taxation affects the cost of external funds for the
firm. An international firm can raise funds in the host country as well as in the home
country. As long as local fund raising in the host country is feasible and less costly, the
parent will have an incentive to reduce its transfers and to let the subsidiary rely more on
this alternative source. Since interest payments are tax deductible, a reduction in the
domestic corporate tax rate implies that local borrowing in the host country becomes cheaper.
How can we combine all these aspects of the tax effects on international investment in
a single theoretical framework? The strategy adopted in this paper is to "divide and conquer."
The complete problem of the international firm, which is assumed to consist of the parent
and a subsidiary, is analyzed in three stages: the subsidiary problem, the intrafirm problem.and theparentproblem. These three stages exactly corresponds to the three channels
mentioned above of the tax effects on direct investment.
Our analysis begins in Section 2 with a presentation of the basic model of the
subsidiary's intertemporal maximization. This first stage examines how the effects of foreign
source income taxes on direct investment are affected by the subsidiary's financing and
dividend policy. Section 3 treats the intrafirm problem by integrating the subsidiary's
foreign operation and the parent's domestic operation. The tax effects through the foreign
source income tax and the relative net return channels are combined to derive the criteria for
intrafirm investment allocation. In Section 4, the parent problem --thelast stage of the
firm problem --isdefined as minimization of the international firms overall cost of funds,
which is consistent with share value maximization in equilibrium. The relative cost of funds
channel is discussed in this context. The concluding Section summarizes the basic results of
the model.
2. The Subsidiary Problem
This Section presents a basic model of the subsidiary's intertemporal maximization
problem. The subsidiary wishes to maximize its firm value, which can be expressed as the
present discounted value of the net payments to the parent. In order to concentrate on the
effects of tax rules applied to foreign source income --thefirst channel --weassume at this
stage that the rate of return required by the parent on foreign investments is exogenous to the
subsidiary's problem. The major focus of this section is on the way in which the
subsidiary's financial policy influences the tax effects on investment incentives.
32.1 The Basic Model
At the first two stages, we focus on the case in which foreign investments are financed
only through internal funds available within the international firm. More specifically, the
subsidiary can finance its operations either by retaining earnings or by drawing funds from
the parent. For simplicity, we assume that transfers by the parent consist only of equity
investments and that dividends are the only form of income repatriation by the subsidiary.
The model assumes that the home country corporate tax rate t is greater than the host country
rate t. since it is the more interesting and more plausible case than that where t >s,as
argued in Jun (1988). In this model, there is no uncertainty and all tax rates are perceived to
be constant over time. Time subscripts are suppressed in roost cases for simplicity. 1
The after-tax return on direct investment to the parent is:
(l-t){D/(l t*)]fV +(V-T)/V (1)
where D is the subsidiary's dividend payments, T represents transfers from the parent, and V
is the value of the subsidiary in the current period. Since a credit is allowed for taxes deemed
to be paid in the host country, dividends are grossed up (Df(lt*)) before the home country
tax is applied. From the perspective of the parent, the sole shareholder of the subsidiary in
this model, D/(1t*) represents the total dividend income while the subsidiary's retained
earnings are considered capital gains. Note that domestic taxes are imposed only on
repatriated income.
1 We ignore witholding taxes on dividend payments imposed by the host country government. These taxes
axe similar to the home country tax in that they are imposed only when income is repathated. They are also
similar to the host country tax in that the foreign tax credit is allowed for these taxes against the firms
home country tax liability.
4In equilibrium, we assume that the parent earns its required rate of return R. Then, we
cart write a differential equation for the value of the subsidiary V:
VRV-(lL)D/(l.t*) +T (2)
whereR is assumed to be exogenous by the subsidiary. Subject to the transversality
condition:
urn v5 exp( -Rs )= 0 (3) S —*
equation (2) can be solved forward to get an expression for the value of the subsidiary:
V =J[ D(lt)/(lt*) -T]exp(-Rs) ds (4)
Equation (4) shows that the value of the subsidiary is the present discounted value of
net payments by the subsidiary to the parent.
The subsidiary maximizes its firm value subject to the following constraints:
(1t*)F*(K) + T =D+ IC(I) (5a)
K=I (5b)
D0 (5c)
T T, T￿0 (5d)
5where K is the subsidiary's capital stock. F*(K) is the subsidiary's earnings, I is direct
investment, T is the maximum level of equity capital redemption, and C(I) is adjustment
costs.
Equation (5a) is the cash flow identity for the subsidiary. The total cash flow available
to the subsidiary in any period is either repatriated to the parent or reinvested in the host
country. This equation can also be interpreted as the financing equation showing that foreign
investment can be financed by retaining earnings ((lt*)F* -D)and/or by drawing transfers
from the parent (T). The production function is assumed to be concave, while the investment
technology is given by a convex adjustment cost function C(I). Equation (5b) shows the
evolution of the subsidiary's capital stock. There is no depreciation. Equation (5c) is a
nonnegativity condition for dividends.
The subsidiary can repatriate its equity capital (T <0)as well as its earnings. In
principle, the redemption of equity capital is tax-exempt while the repatriated earnings are
taxable in the home country. In order to prevent a firm from treating all repatriated funds as
equity capital, as a general rule all remissions are treated as taxable earnings as long as
accumulated repayments are less than accumulated earnings. Equation (5d) reflects the
restrictions on the subsidiary's ability to repatriate tax-exempt funds to the parent.
One direct implication of assuming that t >tin this maximization problem is that the
parent is tax-penalized when the subsidiary simultaneously pays dividends and draws funds
from the parent. Equations (4) and (5) show that if both (T -T)and D are greater than zero,
an equal reduction of both terms can increase the subsidiary's value without affecting F* or
IC(I). An immature subsidiary with investment expenditures (IC(I)) in excess of after-tax
earnings ((lt*)F*) must draw funds from the parent even in this case. However, a mature
6subsidiary with after-tax earnings in excess of investments should exploit the tax exempt
repatriation before paying any dividends; thus, the T ￿ T constraint is binding. In sum, the
above argument implies that no subsidiaries, mature or immature, should pay dividends and
draw funds simultaneously. This aspect of taxation has important implications for the
determination of the optimal marginal source of funds.
2.2 Retained Earnings vs. Parent Transfers as the Marginal Source of Funds
A central issue in studying the effects of tax rules applied to foreign source income is
the method of financing the marginal foreign investment. The tax effects on the subsidiary's
cost of capital can vary widely depending on the choice of the marginal source of funds.
Many traditional researchers either have ignored the subsidiary's retained earnings or have
assumed a fixed dividend payout ratio so that they can regard parent transfers as the marginal
source of funds.2 They justify their stable dividends assumption with explanations similar to
ones used to explain the financial behavior of domestic firms such as signalling or the need
to maintain an optimal debt-capital ratio. However, since the subsidiary's dividend payment is
an intrafirm transaction, dividend-paying motives employed in the context of the domestic
firm-shareholder relationship may not be readily applied.
Noticing the lack of a good theory to explain intrafirm dividends, other researchers
[e.g.. Hartman (1985), Koptis (1980)] argue that retained earnings must be the marginal
source of funds for mature subsidiaries since drawing transfers incurs an avoidable tax
liability as we saw above. Dividends are determined simply as a residual after profitable
investments are undertaken.3
2 Caves (1982) provides a summary of Iraditional studies on these issues.
3 Jun (1988) presents a complete analysis of the marginal source of funds for foreign mvescrnent.
7First, suppose that, as the tax capitalization view predicts, the subsidiary finances
investments by retaining earnings. In this view, the transfer constraint (Sd) is binding since
this subsidiary cannot find a tax-exempt channel for repatriation. To characterize dividends as
a residual, we rewrite the cash flow identity (5a) as:
D =(It*)F*(K)-ICU)+T (6)
The expression for the market value of the subsidiary can be rewritten as:
V =Jexp(Rs)[(1t)F*(K)-(1t)IC(I)/(1t*)+(t*t)T/(lt*)]ds
(7)
The firm chooses an investment policy to maximize V subject to the capital evolution
constraint (equation (Sb)). The Hamiltonian for the problem is:
H =expERt)[(lt)F*(K) -(1t)IC(I)/(lt*)+(t*t)T/(1_t*)+qI]
(8)
where q is the shadow value of installed capital. The first-order conditions for optimality
are:
[(l_t)/(l_t*)][C(I) + IC(I)J = q (9)
q=Rq-(1t)F*(K) (10)
limq exp(-Rs) =0 (Ii)
8Equation (9) shows thatinvestmenttakes place until the marginal cost of investing out
of retained earnings equals the shadow price of installed capital. Since C' >0and C" >0,
the equation can be inverted to derive investment I as an increasing function of q.
I =K=h(q(1t*)/(1t))h' >0,h(l) =0 (12)
We normalized the adjustment cost function so that h(1) =0,to give a better comparison of
our formulation and Tobin's q theory of investment. Equation (10) describes the evolution of
the shadow price of capital q. It can be shown that q equals the present value of the future
stream of net marginal products of one unit of capital.
In the portfolio equilibrium, which is defined as the q =0locus,
q =(1t)F*'/R (13)
The equilibrium shadow price of capital is the ratio of its net marginal product to the after-
tax Cost of funds. Similarly, the K =0locus depicts the investment equilibrium in which:
q =(1_t)/(1_t*) (14)
from equation (12). Since we assume that t >t,the equilibrium value of q is less than
unity. The subsidiary invests until the marginal value of one dollar investments equal its
opportunity cost, or the amount the parent would receive if the dollar were repatriated.
The subsidiary's cost of capital, COC. which is defined as being equal to F*' in
equilibrium, can be derived from equations (13) and (14).
9COC = Rf(1t*) (15)
Thehome country's tax policy towards foreign source income has no effect on the cost of
capital. Since deferred home country taxes are an unavoidable liability, they are capitalized
in the market value of the firm. The tax capitalization view implies that tax rules applied to
foreign source income including the foreign tax credit have no effect on the marginal
investment decision of mature subsidiaries.
Next, we consider the case in which parent transfers are the marginal source of funds.
Suppose that for some reason the parent values dividends so that the mature subsidiary pays a
4
fixedportion d of its after-tax earnings as dividends:
D =d(1t*)F*(K) (16)
The cash flow identity (5a) can be rewritten as:
(ld)(lt*)F*(K) + T =IC(I) (17)
which shows that the subsidiary needs parent transfers in addition to retained earnings to




In order to reflect the benefits that the parent may derive from the subsidiary's dividend payments, one
may assume that the required rate of return (R) is a decreasing function of the dividend payout ratio as
Poterba and Summers (1985) do in the case of the domestic firm. However, this formulation and the fixed
payout ratio are observationally the same and produce the same effects unless the function is specifically





Solving the maximization problem as before gives the following equations of motion:
I =K=h(q)h> 0, h(1) =0 (19)
q =Rq-(1ETR)F* (20)
In the portfolio equilibrium in which q =0,
q =(1ETR)F*/R (21)
whereas in the investment equilibrium in which K =0,
q=l (22)
The cost of capital can be derived from the above equilibrium conditions:
COC =R/(l-ETR) (23)
The effective tax rate ETR is the weighted average of the home and host country tax rates,
where the weight equals the dividend payout ratio. This result represents the traditional view
[e.g., Horst (1977) 1thatthe home country tax can affect foreign investment and that tax
11deferral favors direct investment by reducing the effective tax rate below the home country
rate.
One extreme case is when the subsidiary retains no earnings so that d =1.Then, the
effective tax rate will be the home country rate t. The same result will hold if the home
country does not allow tax deferral, so that taxes are paid on an accrual basis. This no
retention or no deferral case will prove to be an useful reference when the neutrality of the
tax system regarding international investment is discussed.
The first three columns of Table 1 summarize the basic results of the subsidiary
problem under different regimes. The first two lines show the values of q in the portfolio
equilibrium and in the investment equilibrium respectively. The expressions for the cost of
capital reveal the effects of tax policy toward foreign source income on direct investment --
thefirst tax channel. Note that the home country tax is irrelevant to the foreign investment
decision under the retained earnings regime while the host country tax is irrelevant under the
no retention or no deferral regime. This fact summarizes the debate on tax neutrality
regarding international investment. For subsidiaries with retained earnings as the marginal
source of funds, the effective tax rate is the host country tax rate t. Domestic and foreign
investors are taxed equally from the perspective of the host country. This is called 'capital
import neutrality.' On the other hand, in the extreme ease of no retention or no tax deferral,
the effective tax rate is the home country tax rate t. From the perspective of the home
country, domestic and foreign investments receive equal tax treatment. This is called 'capital
export neutrality.' Under the more realistic parent transfers regime, tax deferral would reduce
the effective tax rate below the home country rate, favoring capital outflows.
The above neutrality debate has important implications for the effectiveness of the two
major features of the residence approach --taxdeferral and the foreign tax credit --aspolicy
12instruments toward direct investment. Except in the extreme case of no retention (d=l), tax
deferral favors direct investment by reducing the effective tax rate. On the other hand, the
effect of the credit policy can differ substantially between the two major regimes. Under the
retained earnings regime, the foreign tax credit is irrelevant to the foreign investment
decision. Under the parent transfers regime, the deferral and credit policies are both effective
and must be combined properly. For example, eliminating foreign tax credits in order to
stem capital outflows might lead subsidiaries to defer taxation by retaining more earnings,
resulting in more direct investments.
3. The Intrafirm Problem
Although the parent is in charge of domestic operations in the home country, its major
concern is the maximization of the overall profits of the international firm. Thus, to gain
proper understanding of the international firm's behavior, it is imperative to integrate the
subsidiary's foreign operation with the parent's domestic operation. Besides, while the
practice of isolating the subsidiary's maximization problem is a convenient way of
summarizing the effects of foreign source income taxes on direct investment, it can be quite
misleading when we try to understand the overall effects of the home country tax system on
direct investment. Tax policy can also affect direct investment through other channels, which
can be best analyzed when we recognize that the subsidiary is one part of the international
firm.
In this section, we introduce two different but mutually consistent approaches to
integrating domestic and foreign operations in the model. First, one can stress the global
objective of the parent by including its transactions with the subsidiary (i.e. intrafirm
variables such as transfers by the parent and dividend payments by the subsidiary) in its
13global budget constraint. Second, recognition of the ownership chain of the international
firm --thesubsidiary is owned by the parent which is ultimately owned by the domestic
shareholders --willmake it possible to define a proper rate of return required by each party's
immediate owner. Thus, just as the parent discounts the profit stream using the rate of
return required by the shareholders as in the standard finance literature, the subsidiary will
base its operation on the return required by its owner, the parent. Note that in the previous
section, we solved the subsidiary's maximization problem given an exogenous required rate of
return.
By solving the intrafirm problem, we can explicitlyderive criteria for intrafirm
allocation of investments between domestic and foreign operations. The allocation criteria
summarize the tax effects at the first two channels --taxpolicy toward foreign source income
and the relative net rates of return. It is also shown that the intrafirm allocation criteria do
not include parameters associated with domestic shareholders, while in the long run the
subsidiary's cost of capital can be expressed as a function of the rate of return requiredby the
shareholders. This results implies that although the subsidiary is ultimately owned by the
domestic shareholders through the ownership chain, the investment location decision is a pure
intrafirm variable which is not directly affected by the shareholders. We call these results the
5
parent-veil.
Todistinguish between domestic and foreign operations, we denote variables associated
with the subsidiary by stars (*).Thesubsidiary's dividend payments are now denoted by Dt
while D represents the parent's dividend payments to the shareholders. Similarly, I, K, q,
COC, and F are variables related to domestic investment while the starred counterparts denote
5 Anempiricaltest of this"parent-veil" hypothesis ispresentedin Jun (1989).
14those for the subsidiary. The intrafirm variable T still denotes parent transfers while E
represents new share issues by the parent in the home country.
For reference, we begin with the parents problem in the absence of foreign operations.
The domestic firm problem can be represented by the arbitrage equation in equilibrium:
r =(1-m)DIV+(1-z)(V -E)/V (24)
where r is the rate of return required by the shareholders, and m and z are the marginal tax
rates on dividends and capital gains respectively. Following the procedure applied to the
subsidiary problem in Section 2, we can obtain an expression for the value of the firm:
V =Jexp[-rs/(l-z)][(1-m)D/(l-z)-E] (25)
where V is the present discounted value of after-tax dividends less new share issues. The cash
flow constraint for this domestic firm is:
(l-t)F(K) +E=I+D (26)
where the adjustment cost function is suppressed for simplicity. Also for simplicity, we
assume throughout the discussion that domestic investment is financed by retaining earnings
at the margin, implying that E =0.Solving the optimization problem will give the
following equations of motion.
q =[r/(l-z)]q -(1-t)(1 -m)F'/(l -z) (27)
K =h(q(1-z)/(l-m)) h >0,h(l) =0 (28)
15From these equations we can obtain the following equilibrium results which are also
presented in the last column of Table 1:
Portfolio equilibrium: q = (l-t)F/[r/(l-m)1 (29)
Investmentequilibrium: q = (1.m)/(1-z) (30)
Cost of capital: COC r/[(l-t)(l-z)J (31)
Inorder to integrate the foreign and domestic operations. we introduce two approaches
which are consistent with each other but which stress different aspects of the integrated firm
problem.
3.1 The Global Approach
We can stress the global objective of the parent by expanding the parents budget
constraint (26) to include transactions with the subsidiary.
(l-t)[F + D*/(1t*)] + E=I+T + D (32)
The parent can receive dividends, which are grossed up to include the foreign tax credit, from
the subsidiary and also make transfers to the subsidiary. The subsidiarys constraint (5a) is
reproduced below for convenience with notational adjustments.
(1.t*)F* + T = D* + I (33)
16These two constraints can be combined by eliminating D* to produce a global budget
constraint:
(l-t)[F +F*J+E=T(t_t*)/(lt*)+I+I*(l_t)/(l_t*)]+D (34)
The remaining intrafirm variable T can also be eliminated through the assumption made about
the marginal source of financing foreign investment. Remember that domestic investment is
assumed to be financed through retained earnings (E =0).
With retained earnings as the marginal source of financing foreign investment, the
binding transfer constraint can be conveniently represented by T =0.Then:
(l-t)[F +F*]=I+I*(l_t)/(lt*)+D (35)
Underthe parent transfers regime, T =1*-(ld)(lt*)F*since=d(l_t*)F*.Therefore:
(l-t)F +(l-ETR)Ft=I+1*+D (36)
In both cases, the identities show that the sources of funds for the international firm are
matched by the uses of funds. Equation (35) shows the tax capitalization aspect of the
subsidiary's earnings, implying that the "trapped money is a cheaper source of funds.
Equation (36) shows that from the parent's perspective, the opportunity cost of marginal
domestic investment is the same as that for foreign investment under the transfer regime.
Subject to these constraints and other necessary assumptions, the parent's maximization
problem expressed in equation (26) can be solved to yield expressions for the valuation and
17the cost of capital for domestic and foreign operations. Since the maximization problem of
the global operations per se is not our major concern, we discuss a special case, the solution
of which allows us to make a more intuitive interpretation.
Suppose that the international firm has no domestic operations so the parent's role is
to be a liaison between the subsidiary and the shareholders. The subsidiary directly pays
dividends (D*) to and receive transfers (i.e. issue shares: T =E)from the shareholders. In
equilibrium,
r =(1m)[(l.t)D*/(1 .t*fl/V + (1-z)( V - T)/V (37)
where(1t)D*/(1t*) =D,the before.personal-tax dividends to the shareholders. The solution
to the maximization problem implied by the above differential equation is presented in the
Appendix. The equilibrium results with retained earnings as the marginal source of funds for
foreign investment are:
Portfolio equilibrium: q* =(lt)F*I[r/(lm) (38)
Investment equilibrium: q* =[O_t)/(1_t*)][(1.m)/IJ.z)] (39)
Cost of capital: COC* =r/[(1t*)(lz)] (40)
Note that in the steady state, the cost of capital for foreign investment can be expressed as a
function of r, the rate of return required by the shareholders.
Integrated budget constraints and a framework for consistent firm objectives can be
derived under this "global" approach, but it is difficult to focus on the intrafirm allocation of
investment, which is one of our major concerns at this second stage.
183.2 The Sectoral Approach
By analyzing domestic and foreign operations separately first and later connecting the
two sectors, we can not only reproduce the same consistent results as under the global
approach but also provide the criteria on which intrafirm investment allocation takes place.
This sectoral' approach is also useful in reviewing the debate concerning the neutrality of
the tax system toward foreign investment.
We propose that the rate of return required on foreign investment by the parent (R) is
equal to the maximum domestic net return ((1-t)F').
R =(l-L)F' (41)
Equation (41) implies that in the portfolio equilibrium, the denominator of q* (the cost of
funds for foreign investment) is equal to the numerator of q (the expected marginal product
from domestic investment). This proposition is intuitively plausible since the parent and the
subsidiary are very likely to be in the portfolio equilibrium simultaneously even in the short
run. We prove this proposition in the retained earnings case by reproducing the integrated
equilibrium represented by equations (38) to (40).
The first row in Table 2 shows foreign and domestic q values in the portfolio
equilibrium (q =(lL)F*/Rand q =(1-t)F'/[r/(l-m)I).It can be shown from these results




The equilibrium consequences for the investment allocation can be shown by assuming the
investment equilibrium as well. The second line of Table 2 shows that in the investment
equilibrium:
q*q =[(1t)/(1t)][(1 -m)/(l -z)] (44)
Now, equations (43) and (44) can be combined to produce in the steady state:
COC =r/(1-t)(l-z)] (45)
The solution system under this sectoral approach (equations (43) to (45)) exactly
reproduces the system obtained under the global approach (equations (38) to (40)). Note that
the values of q* in equations (38) and (39) are represented by the product of q* and q in
equations (43) and (44). This fact holds true because in the global approach, we assume that
the subsidiary can directly reach the shareholders while in the sectoral approach, the domestic
operation acts as an intermediary between the foreign operation and the shareholders.
One important advantage behind the sectoral approach is that only in this context can
the criterion for the intrafirm allocation of investment be derived.It can also be shown that
from equation (42) and the expression for q* in the investment equilibrium (q* =
(1_tF*'=(l-t)F (46)
20Equation (46) implies that under the retained earnings regime, the firm should invest abroad
until the net returns in both places are equalized. As discussed in Section 2. under this
regime, tax rules applied to foreign source income are irrelevant to foreign investment. The
tax rate t in the above equation denotes the effective tax rate, which determines the net return
on domestic investment. Thus, even under this regime, domestic tax policy can influence
direct investments by affecting relative net returns.
Table 2 summarizes the results of the intrafirm problem under different financing
regimes. The first column reproduces the results obtained from the retained earnings regime.
Line (4)ofthe table shows that in the long run the subsidiary's cost of capital can be
expressed as a function of the rate of return required by the shareholders (r). Note that the
results reported in this table are the sum of the tax effects through the foreign source income
tax and the relative net return --firstand second --channels.The relative net return tax
channel itself is independent of the marginal source of funds. Thus, the results under each
financing regime differ from each other because of the varying effects at the first channel
analyzed in the previous Section.
The allocation criterion under the no retention or no deferral regime shows that only
gross returns matter since the tax effects of the first and the second channels exactly cancel
out. From the perspective of the home country, domestic and foreign investments receive
equal tax treatment; This is a restatement of capital export neutrality.Under the more
realistic regimes, due to tax deferral, the relative net return effects will overwhelm the
foreign source income tax effects in absolute values. Note that capital export neutrality can
be destroyed not only by tax deferrals but also by, though not explicitly shown in the table,
the deviation of the effective Lax rate on domestic investment from the statutory rate.
214. The Parent Problem
The third channel through which tax policy can affect direct investment concerns the
effect of taxation on the cost of external funds to the international firm. The discussion so
far has focused primarily on issues related to intrafirm transactions and therefore on the
allocation of funds available within the firm. For a domestic firm, internal funds are retained
earnings while external funds are raised by issuing new ihares and bonds. Similarly, internal
funds for an international firm consist of the retained earnings of both the parent and the
subsidiary. In addition to stock and bond issues at home, however, another major source of
external funds for the international firm is local borrowing by the subsidiary in the host
country.
The parent concerned with overall profit maximization is sensitive to any difference in
the cost of external funds between places. The parent problem --thethird stage of the firm
problem --isconveniently defined as minimizing the overall cost of funds which is
consistent with share value maximization in equilibrium. As long at local fund-raissng in
the host country is feasible and less costly, the parent will have an incentive to reduce its
transfers and allow the subsidiary to rely more on this source.
Tax rules are always a central focus of the debate on the real effects of corporate
financial policy. Since income accruing within a firm and income accruing directly so
individuals receive different tax treatments, there is an incentive at the margin for the firm to
favor debt financing until the benefits from the tax deductibility of interest payments equal
the potential bankruptcy and agency costs associated with a higher debt-equity ratio. For the
international firm, the possibility of raising funds in both countries creates another
opportunity for tax arbitrage. The intuition behind this can be easily illustrated by a simple
example. Suppose that both the parent and the subsidiary borrow at the margin to raise
22funds. The cost of domestic and foreign funds can be defined as COF =(1-t)iand COF =(1-
t*)i* respectively where i and i are the interest rates. A reduction in the domestic tax rate
implies that local borrowing in the host country becomes a cheaper source of external funds,
other things being equal. As a result of the change in the relative cost of funds between
countries, the subsidiary is more likely to resort to local borrowing and less likely to receive
transfers by the parent than before.
This relative Cost of funds channel has not been recognized in the existing literature
but can be quite important in practice. The tax treaty between the U.S. and the Netherlands
Antilles makes it possible for U.S. parents to raise funds abroad through their Netherlands
Antilles finance affiliates without paying U.S withholding taxes on Interest payments to
foreigners.6 S ince the funds reloaned by those affiliates to their parents have been recorded as
negative direct investment in U.S. balance of payments, the tax effect illustrated in the
example can figure significantly.
5. Conclusion
Table 3 summarizes the effects of domestic tax policy on direct investment abroad.
More specifically, the table shows the effects of raising the domestic corporate tax rate under
the different financing regimes and tax channels. The first line shows the effects of tax
policy toward foreign source income on direct investment. Under the retained earnings
regime, this aspect of the tax change has no relevance to the direct investment decision. The
relative net return channel is independent of the financing regime. The reduced domestic net
return would drive more investments abroad. The sum of the effects through these two
6 For a more detailed discussion of the Netherlands Antilles case, see Jun (1989).
23channels is presented in the third line of the table. This result is bssed on line (5)ofTable
2. Under the extreme no retention or no deferral regime, the effects of these two channels
exactly cancel each other out. Under the more realistic parent transfers regime, the relative
return effect exceeds the foreign source income tax effect since tax deferral dilutes the
negative tax effect on the subsidiary's cost of capital through the first channel. The relative
cost of funds channel is also not affected by a specific choice of regime. The relatively
cheaper domestic fund raising implied by increased tax deductions suggests more direct
investment outflows. The sum of the effects through all three channels indicates that an
increase in the home country tax rate will have a positive effect on direct investment abroad.
Although the model is built parsimoniously in order to obtain intuitive results, the
three-channel structure of the present analysis is rich enough to yield several implications for
tax policies. First, the model shows different channels through which a given policy affects
direct investment. More specifically, a reduction in the home country tax rate could reduce
direct investment through its effect on the subsidiary's cost of capital while increasing direct
investment by affecting relative net returns and the relative cost of funds between countries.
The nature and extent of such offsetting effects depend on the financing regime at the margin.
Second, this multi-channel analysis facilitates the evaluation of different types of tax
policies. For example, a statutory rate change applies to all three channels while the foreign
tax credit and the investment tax credit each work through only one channel, the first and the
second respectively. This also suggests that we can study the effects of taxation on the
composition as well as the level of direct investment. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 includes
provisions reducing the statutory corporate tax rate, repealing the investment tax credit, and
restricting the foreign tax credit and tax deferrals. The overall effect of these provisions on
direct investment is unclear since these policies can have offsetting effects. Specifically, the
rate cut, which has negative overall effects on direct investment as shown in Table 3, could
24reinforce the unfavorable effects of policies regarding income repatriation and offset the
favorable effects of the repeal of the investment tax credit. However, such a combination of
policies may imply, for example, that relatively more equipment investment will be
undertaken by foreign subsidiaries.
Third, the analysis shows that different financing regimes yield very different
implications for the relative efficacy of the foreign tax credit and tax deferrals as a policy
instrument. The tax capitalization view predicts that repealing tax deferral can have much
stronger effects on direct investment than a change in the credit system. If parent transfers
are the major financing source at the margin as argued in Jun (1988), however, both
instruments can be important and must be combined properly. For example, a restriction on
the foreign tax credit aimed at discouraging foreign investment could backfire since
subsidiaries may retain more earnings to avoid double taxation.
In sum, the analysis presented in this paper suggests that taxation can have a
significant effect on international investment. The diversity of the ways in which taxation
can affect international investment suggests the importance of empirical work on these
issues.
25Appendix: A Special Case Under the Global Approach
We reproduce the arbitrage condition (37) as:
=(1m)[(lt)D*/(l.t*)/V +(1-z)(V- T)/V (Al)
where (1t)D*/(1t*) =D.Then, we can write a differential equation for V, the value of the
firm:
V rV/(l—z) —[(1-m)/(l _z)][(l_t)D*/(l _t*)] + T (A2)
Subject to the iransversality condition:
urn vexp[-rs/(l-z)]=0 (A3)
S —3°
equation(A2) can be solved forward to get an expression for the firm value:
V =1 [(lm)/(1z)][(lt)/(lt*)]D*
-T]exp[-rsl(1-z)J ds (A4)
The subsidiary maximizes its firm value subject to the same constraints in equations
(5a) to (5d), where D, I, and K now mean D*, 1*, and K* respectively. The solution
procedure behind the maximization problem is analogous to those in the previous cases.
Under the retained earnings regime, the equations of motion will be:
=1*=h([(l.t*)/(lt)][(l -z)/(1-m)])h' > 0, h(l) =0 (A5)
26q* =rq/(l-z)-(1-t)(l-m)Ft/(1-z) (A6)
In the portfolio equilibrium (qt =0):
=(1-t)Ft I[r/(1-rn)] (A7)
In the investment equilibrium (K* =0):
q* =[(14)/(1_t*)]/[(l -m)/(l-z)] (A8)
Note that q* will be less than unity both because t >tand because m >z.The cost of
capital can be derived from equations (A7) and (A8):
COC =r/[(lt*)(1_c)] (A9)
27*am grateful to Alan Auerbach, Martin Feldstein, James Poterba and Lawrence Summers
for helpful discussions.
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EarningsTransfers No Deferral Earnings
(Ocdcl) (d=l)
PortfolioEquilibrium: (q=O):
(I) q II:i￿E! II:IR)EJ u1i)E±) (I:i)E
R R R r/(l-m)
Investment Equilibrium: (K=O):
(2) q 11:1) 1 1 11:111)
(l_t*) (l—z)
Steady State (qK =0):
(3)COC B. & K I
(1—t) (1 —ETR) (1 —1) (1 —t)(1 —z)
(4) Tax Capital Capital
NeutralityImport - Export -
Neutrality Neutrality
(5) J 0 <0 <0 -
Note:ETR =dt+ (l-d)tt
m, a: marginal tax rates on dividends and capital gains, respectively
R: rate of return required on direct investment by the parent
r: rate of return required on domestic investment by the shareholders
t, t*: home and host country tax rates
30Table 2: The Intrafirm Problem (R =(1-t)F)





(2) q*q L1:i￿E (I:EIR)EJ (1:L)E
r/(l-m) r/(l-m) r/(l-m)
Investment Equilibrium: (K=K*=O):






Alloc, (1 t*)F* '=(1-t)F' (1 ETR)F* =(1-t)F F* =F
Criterion
(6) Tax Capital Import Capital Export
Neutrality Neutrality Neutrality
Note: 1. Domestic investment is financed by retaining earnings.
2. ETR =dt+(1d)t*
3. Unlike in Table 1, we now distinguish between the
subsidiary and parent variables. (e.g. q and q*)
31Table 3: Tax Effects on Direct Investment Abroad (dI*/at)




foreign source income 0 - -
(thefirst channel)
The relative net
return + + +
(thesecond channel)
The sum of the
first two channels + + 0
(from Table 7 (5))
The relative cost
of funds + + +
(thethird channel)
The sum of all
three channels + + +
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